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WESLEYAN STUDIES IN RELIGION

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The Relation Between Religion And Philosophy*

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

Religion and philosophy are historic powers within the academic community. Certainly both religion and philosophy reach out beyond academic life. In their generality they center in humanity's need to worship and to know; they are, indeed, coeval with man's thinking. But our concern now is with their place and function in higher education. The relation between them in our day is exceptionally critical. We are in the midst of a basic re-evaluation of this relation on the part of both philosophy and religion. For our comfort we may recall the saying that on the whole the unstable ages are the most creative.

The approach of our analysis is simple. We shall address ourselves first to the classical task of philosophy and then show how fundamentally shaken this view of philosophy is by contemporary thinking. After that we shall discuss the classical task of religion and indicate how beset this, too, is by modern thought. Finally we shall propose a relationship that we hope will preserve the heart of the historical tasks while also being fully open to their transformation in the light of current criticism.

I.

The classical task of philosophy is the interpretation of man's experience as a whole. Philosophy has been concerned with rational knowledge in its totality. It has carried on its work within three emphases: 1) the empirical task, shared with science; 2) the analytical

*The Windover Hills Lecture in Religion, given at West Virginia Wesleyan College, February 9, 1961.

task, its distinctive responsibility; and 3) the contextual task, shared with religion. Philosophy has always been engaged in factual knowing, symbolized by correspondence; in logical investigation, symbolized by consistency; in the evaluative and interpretative organizing of experience, symbolized by coherence. The threefold task of philosophy has comprised the understanding of fact, form and meaning for life. The main drive of philosophy, as its history amply attests, has been integrative of these three areas of knowledge.

The modern challenges to classical philosophy are basically two. Linguistic analysis has torn asunder the classical assumption of the identity of being and meaning that was the presupposition of philosophical inquiry from Parmenides to Hume and Kant. The main line of attack on the part of linguistic analysis is clear. Knowledge is either analytical and necessary or empirical and contingent. Philosophy deals properly with propositional meaning. The inquiry for concrete fact has been pre-empted by science. Philosophy is methodologically in no position to compete with science and should recognize this fact. Metaphysics, or the contextual task of philosophy, is illegitimate in that it is neither analytical nor properly empirical. It is neither a matter of analysis of meaning nor capable of public verification in the realm of fact. Therefore, it is not properly knowledge.

Modern philosophy, for a large and strong part, has taken as its frame of reference and its attitudinal stance that knowledge is analytical validation or empirical vertification and therefore, leaving the empirical realm of inquiry to science, it has rigidly delimited the field of philosophy to the analysis of meaning. By so doing this section of modern philosophy has abandoned the main tasks of classical philosophy, at least in the approach to them. It seems thereby to have dismantled and even denuded the classical function of philosophy. We shall consider later whether or not this charge is true.

Classical philosophy has also been attacked by depth psychology. Attainable objectivity is a presupposition of methodological adequacy on the part of classical philosophy. Depth psychology has stressed as fact the idea that why we say something is more important than what we say. Reason, it holds, is rationalization of self-interest. It is pressured out of focus by dominant drives of self-interest or group will. It has here, incidentally, echoed the charge by Christian interpreters to the effect that sinful man cannot think objectively concerning God. Man is not free to choose sides from within some morally and spiritual-

ly neutral territory but is driven from within. Classical philosophy could dismiss the Christian charge as religious bias, but depth psychology claims to be a secular and even a scientific subject.

It may not be out of place to observe in passing that such assault on classical objectivity cuts in several directions. Both secular and religious thinkers can see how easily reason can become a dodge from reality. Thus, for instance, naturalistic reductionism, especially in the form of mechanistic determinism, can be seen as ideology, not science, whereby man fled from the responsibility of personal and social choice. The Christian thinker will claim that the flight was not only from freedom but from God. When modern science itself broke through the ironclad jacket of continuity and discovered an open universe, man had to find a new city of refuge from freedom and from God. Either depth psychology declaring religion to be projective rationalization or a new theory of logic ruling the religious question out of bounds would do. Depth psychology, at least in certain forms, and philosophic meaninglessness may both be constructs of protective ideology!

II

The classical task of religion has been twofold: 1) to know and to accept ultimate reality; 2) to find what is the ultimate good and to do what is ultimately right.

Today words about religion fail to communicate because of rapidly changing usage and mood. We use "ultimate reality" as the determinative focus of classical religion because the term is itself classical. Definitions of religion may be either too narrow or too wide. Herbert Farmer in his Gifford Lectures has defined religion in terms of the supreme personal Being. He may be right. Such may be the truest ultimate religious reference. But have we the right to rule out Buddhism and high Hinduism, for instance, as religious? And what of men like Bultmann and Tillich who feel that as modern men they can no longer hold the classical Christian confession of the personal God? Must we even rule out as religious men like Jaspers and Heidegger?

Perhaps, on the other hand, Tillich's definition that religion is what concerns us ultimately or unconditionally is too broad, if taken by itself. It is significantly a recognition that religion is man's response to what is ultimate; but may it not be necessary to specify that religion, even interpretatively, can never be limited to man's experience but is always a matter of both the realities and powers that go beyond man's ordinary experience? Tillich's own view of religion goes

beyond his definition. Somehow, however, the classical definition of religion in terms of depth reality as contrasted with modern man's definition in terms of depth dimension may spell out at the center the present attack on classical faith.

The second main task of religion is to find what is ultimately good and to do what is ultimately right. Religion is never a mere matter of knowledge. Religion always specializes in worship. Contact with numinous and charismatic reality is the heart of religion. It never seeks truth for truth's sake; that is the realm of philosophy; it always seeks truth for the sake of salvation. Religion also issues in life. It includes conduct. Worship, search for salvation, and conduct are irreducibly constitutive aspects of the classical understanding of religion as these were all viewed and lived in the light and power of ultimate reality.

The modern challenge to classical religion comes from recent philosophy and from depth psychology. From the point of linguistic analysis it is charged that God as necessary being is a contradiction in terms. The term "necessary" has analytical validity exclusively. "Being" refers to existence which can never be more than probably known. No knowledge of being can therefore be necessary. To make the statement "necessary being" is to employ language without regard to its proper logical use. The affirmation that God is necessary being is logically meaningless. Some then add that since it is logically meaningless and since logic is our final arbiter of the correct usage of language, we can know by logic that God does not exist, or that there can be no necessary being.

Another accusation against classical religion is that we cannot logically interpret the whole. God is by definition the category of the whole, no matter how the whole is then understood. Therefore we cannot know, we cannot meaningfully refer to God. The reason that we cannot deal with the whole is that we as interpreters are either inside or outside the whole. If we are inside we cannot see it as a whole. If we are outside, the whole is no longer whole. For that matter, how can knowledge of the whole be verified? Certainly there are neither analytical nor empirical ways of testing such knowledge. Nor can knowledge of the whole be falsified by anything. Therefore religious knowledge dealing with the whole is meaningless.

The second main charge against classical religion comes from depth psychology. It is in fact basically the same charge as that leveled

against classical philosophy. Religion, the accusation reads, is the rationalization of our human predicament. There is no objectively existing God in whose image we are made. We make God, as a father substitute, as a cosmic protector, in our own image. We project our dreams and wishes or we objectify the deeper structures of the Self. To understand well enough the nature and struggle of man is to account for his gods. If religion is to deal with reality, on this view, it must shed its classical superstructure and become revolutionized in terms of man's own inner life.

III

The relation between religion and philosophy which I am to propose is symbiotic; it is symbiotic in co-operation through conflict. It has been said that we should count our best friend our strongest enemy. A friend is honest with us and constructively critical, despising self-centered flattery or avoidance of problems. Let us look first at religion, in the order of a debate, and then finish with philosophy where we started. The answers to the charges made will then come, not within false ways of asking the questions, but within the proper setting of both religion and philosophy. We shall name five central characteristics of religion.

A. 1) Religion is existential. Religion can never become either philosophy or science without forfeiting its own nature. Religion certainly cannot claim necessary knowledge in the logical sense without surrendering its distinctive categories like freedom, sin and grace. Therefore it can never be verified or falsified like a science, except possibly eschatologically, or in the final solution beyond our control. Nor can religion have scientific knowledge without repudiating not only the subjective experience but also the objective import of faith. God cannot be proved by experience and history any more than he can be proved by mere reason. The ultimate cannot be proved by the proximate. Kierkegaard has put us all in his debt at this point.

Yet we must all take a stance. We must live by some presuposition. Religion is not optional. Faith is inescapable for finite beings. Religion is situational. As total selves we must choose concerning both what concerns us ultimately, the subjective decision, and what in fact is ultimate, the objective reality.

Subjectively there are many choices for persons and for cultures; objectively cosmic process puts three main choices before us: a) what came first in process is most real and all else is somehow creative

manifestations of it. Neutral prime stuff alone is permanently real. b) The process as it now is gives us the best picture of reality. We should try to understand it as best we can with its good and evil, with its failures and future possibilities. c) What is to come in line with the highest appearance in human history best indicates the nature of the cosmic process. Human history itself in cosmic time is blitz-emergence. The highest event in it that affords the most explanatory and organizing power for the rest of process most truly indicates the nature of the process.

All these choices can be put in different ways, but they are central. Among them we do in fact choose by what we make concretely central in the configuration of our lives. Existentialism most deeply means that life is continually personal choice of faith but faith concerning the whole nature of the world as we meet it. In this sense the whole is no speculative question but an inescapable burden of decision for every person.

2) The existential nature of religion leads right into its organismic nature. When we respond as entire beings to the totality of the world as it meets us in our experience, we shape this world in our thought and life even while we are the more shaped by that world. We respond to a world sufficiently unified to be called a universe. Everything in that universe is related intimately or ultimately, directly or indirectly. The separation of form from fact, of intellect from existence, or logic from empirical categories is intellectualistic. They are together in experience before they are thought apart. This fact we shall consider in its full significance with respect to philosophy in our next section, but even here it is obvious that it is a major mistake. Religion is not only existential but through and through organismic.

3) Religion is also dialectical. It lives both by faith beyond itself and by reason around itself. It lives by faith and by knowledge in dynamic interaction. There is a dimension of the Word of God and a dimension of the world. There is the normative context of revelation and the descriptive content of the actual world. Somehow these two dimensions must be worked into life and truth. Faith generates the creative reason while knowledge generates the critical reason. Sturdy faith is a growing dialectic between creative faith and critical reason.

4) Religion is mostly a matter of concrete community. When intellectualism takes over, religion dies. Religion is born in the tent

of revelation, not in the cloistered study. The concrete community of faith depends on the seer and the prophet, not on the philosopher. Philosophy is always a damper on faith, useful as a challenge and a check, hurtful when made the final criterion of religious truth. This may be the reason that when systematic theology becomes basically philosophical rather than biblical it undermines faith. Philosophical theology is part of the critical and not the creative reason. Religion is strong only within the life and presuppositions of the concrete community of faith.

5) Finally, religion is eschatological. It centers in the end, be it heaven or nirvana. Religion is life in the light of the ultimate. Whatever end that ultimate provides determines the whole life of religion. The ending, of whatever nature, determines the ends of life. If classical religion were to be verified or falsified it would have to be so only eschatologically. Since we cannot now know the end time or end situation, we might have to settle for some such suggestion as the need for the most exceptional attainment that would most fully exemplify the true potential of all worshippers. The unique is paradoxically the universal, made possible only by the fact that human nature can be "subversively" fulfilled. It can be transformed according to its deepest nature best shown in the most exceptional instance of attainment and contradicted by the ordinary appearance and expectations concerning general attainment. In any case, classical religion is eschatological. The crux of validation can come only in that the highest realization in the exceptional instance must be generally realizable.

B. As we turn to discuss philosophy we should first of all be thankful that this discipline is returning to its distinctive task. 1) Philosophy deals basically with meaning, not with fact nor with salvation. Fact is the province of science; salvation is the domain of religion. When philosophy enters these realms it does so only as a consultant with regard to the correct use of reason. There is need for philosophy in all realms of knowledge, but philosophy cannot become science and compete with science in the area of fact; neither can it become religion and substitute for religion in the order of saving truth. The data for science and for religion are provided within the two fields respectively and when philosophy tries to become one science among many or one religion among many it prostitutes its distinctive task. What it can do, insofar as the philosopher is capable of ample enough

empathy, is to examine the way reason is used with respect to fact or with respect to experience.

2) Philosophy can no more be a metaphysics than a science or a religion. A rational metaphysics is impossible. Every metaphysics is a faith stance. We are not denying secondary objectivity to reason. Our point is not that every interpreter is involved in all ultimate interpretations. Such is the case, but man can still transcend his involvement sufficiently to think beyond it in spite of both finitude and sin. If this were not the case all religions and all configurations of life, as a matter of fact, would be purely arbitrary.

Then, indeed, the charge of depth psychology is true. But then depth psychology is equally subject to such a charge and can be taken as nothing but ideology with reference to ultimates. Already psychologists of standing are beginning to name some of its forms fads like mesmerism. Neither religion nor philosophy should disregard the facts and the interpretations of depth psychology, but both should be secure enough to see its charge in perspective as falsely condemnatory of all life of reason in its high and holy calling. The problem is, rather, to be open to the understanding of the true facts that depth psychology has helped bring to light, like rationalization and the abuses of the life of reason generally. Our claim that every metaphysics is a faith stance springs, then, not from any denial of reason's proper objectivity, but, rather, from the fact that within process there is no conclusive evidence as to the nature of process.

Every ethics is also a faith stance. There is no fully provable rational ethics. An ethics without presupposition is impossible. Every ethical configuration involves metaphysical implications. Rationally responsible conduct, stemming from a concrete person or community, has a context of conduct as well as content of conduct. That context is in the final analysis a faith stance.

3) But philosophy can criticize creatively the method and contexts involved in the finding, establishing and interpreting of facts. There is such a field as the philosophy of science with directive as well as descriptive powers. Philosophy can also criticize creatively both contexts and evaluations in history, art and literature. History, of course, stands as both an art and a science subject to the respective two kinds of appraisal. Philosophy can also review, for consistency of thought and applicability to established fact, such attempts at whole interpretation as are provided for it either by its own creative reason

or by other intellectual approaches. Such examination is not a seeing of the whole as God sees it, which would be a fantastic attempt, but the viewing of the whole from finite foci with awareness not only of man's finitude and sin but also of the mind's power for evaluative appraisal before and after choice, similar to the delayed response which constitutes the heart of thinking. Such secondary weighing of evidence can never take the place of the forced decisions of freedom with respect to the nature of the ultimate, but it can deliver man from total irresponsibility and arbitrariness in the matter of faith.

Thus philosophy, without ever becoming religion, can criticize faith stances in relation to fact, inner consistency and contextual adequacy in relation to religion. To say that philosophy cannot deal with an combination of necessity and being is arbitrarily to create a chasm in man's knowledge at the very center of his need for meaning. Such action is arbitrary because analytical thinking and factual being are in fact together within the interpreter before they are abstracted apart as theory. Since they are thus together in the thinker the most that can be said for any knowledge of necessity even analytically is that we cannot know necessity necessarily. Such a statement tallies with the theologian's understanding that we cannot know any absolute absolutely or that there is always a relative aspect of man's knowledge of God.

Man's very center of need for meaning, moreover, is with relation to reason's use in the field of social, political and religious choices. Neither exact mathematics nor strict science can give us directives in these areas of thought for life. To banish reason from these realms is to abandon man to the hucksters of superstitious faith and to the charlatans of social life. Although final faith judgments are inescapable by virture of man's nature and situation within cosmic process, nevertheless we must take every advantage of the proper use of reason. The fact that in certain realms of life we cannot know with the same degree of objective certainty as in others does not mean that we must therefore surrender these realms to sheer subjectivity. Faith walks best seeing. True meaning never hides ultimate mystery. It steers faith toward the light that it can neither attain nor contain.

Philosophy, then, has as its distinctive task analysis. Its central field is meaning. But it is also symbiotic in nature. It cannot take the place of science, history, aesthetics, ethics or religion. These are contents with which it must deal. But it can serve as the friendly critic.

Theology and philosophy should be disciplines of co-operation. We reiterate that they should be symbiotic as friendly enemies, not to avoid conflict, for religion needs the checking and challenging criticism of philosophy with respect to its claims of faith. Faith matures and is enlightened, yes, changed, by its learning from valid and adequate knowledge.

Philosophy, for its part, needs the drive and wholeness of creative faith to give unity and importance to life, work and civilization. Let there be no false, sentimental friendship, but neither let there be conflict that is unconcerned with the need and truth of faith as man's fullest contact with reality and his most dynamic context for life. Let philosophy do its most critical work with concern, and let religion find the faith that fulfills, rather than frustrates, man's need for integrity even in knowledge.

The Pursuit of Learning To the Glory of God*

J. EDWARD DIRKS

The late Dean Arthur Allen Schoolcraft, whose distinguished life and work as a Christian man is the reason for our being in this place at this moment, has been described by those who knew him best by reference to his style of life. It was apparently dominated by Christian commitment and the concern for communicating vigorously the Christian faith, not only by the encounter of words but also by a way of living which disclosed a system of values and which was given direction and vitality by a system of belief. He was apparently one of those rare figures in our common academic heritage who did not leave behind him monuments in books and publications but who chose instead to pour his thought and affirmation into the process of direct encounter with the minds and lives of other persons.

It is well for all of us and for the family of students and teachers gathered in this College to take thought of this man. We must express our gratitude to the officers and trustees of this College for the vision and determination they had in providing this occasion. I must add my personal word of gratitude also for the honor of having been asked to inaugurate this lectureship. But we must be grateful above all else for having been called to remember the faith and life of the late Dean Schoolcraft. To remember him can be the source of inspiring vision and penetrating expectation. He apparently had a clear knowledge of what was most wanted in a Christian family of learning. Since he was

*The First Schoolcraft Lecture given at West Virginia Wesleyan College, October 14, 1960.

realistic—as every Dean learns very soon—he was concerned with calculating the outcome that is likely to result in action. This is the quality of knowing what people are like, what the world is like, without bitterness and cynicism. He had a moral view of the world based upon the acceptance of a commitment to truth. The only way by which we too can live our beliefs is to find out whether the world is what we believe it to be. And, beyond this, he believed that the Christian faith tells us something decisive and disturbing about what we are meant to be in the purposes of God—in the breadth of space and the duration of time. Christians, he said, are the hope of the world; and we must add that he believed this because he found that Christ demands of us a wide perspective, including finally the whole of creation and eternity. The only way open to us, if we would assume such a perspective, is to consider all peoples, all of history, and all of the best in contemporary knowledge as being relevant to our lives, our thinking, our moral understanding, and our actions. The best that we can, therefore, do, if we would remember him well, is to resolve to consider learning and its pursuits in this place in the wide perspective of God's intention and man's fulfillment.

Some critics of the present academic situation are ready to write off the independent, church-related, liberal arts college such as West Virginia Wesleyan as an anachronism for the world of today and tomorrow. They question whether the churches, already called upon to bear the primary burdens of their God-appointed tasks, should—now that other types of institutions for higher learning are available and able to command wide public and business support—continue their work through colleges. What business, they say, has the Church trying to support the whole enterprise of higher learning, the concern for teaching the secular arts and sciences, of equipping laboratories and supplying libraries, of conducting athletic programs and furthering the fine arts? For such critics the Christian task and commitment is viewed in narrow terms; and, if indeed a college is related to the Church, its primary marks are believed to be those of its chapel, its courses in Bible and religion, or the piety of its faculty and the background of its students. If we who sense the importance of encouraging, supporting, and serving colleges which are church-related and conceive of their tasks in distinctly Christian terms, would make ourselves clear, we must now be prepared to expose and describe the Christian commitment and perspective for its effects upon primary

attitudes toward all of human learning and upon the whole range of what is academically relevant to a college and university.

We have some history to point to. From the earliest days of the schools of the prophets, through the establishment of universities and the establishment of new seats of learning in the age of the Reformation, and the founding of colleges by the churches on the frontiers of the American wilderness and of the missionary cause in the nineteenth century—through all this history, we have evidence of the assertion that the Christian church has been concerned from the beginning with the fostering, cherishing, and transmitting of man's cultural heritage. There have been those movements in the Church which have preferred obscurantism, or who have considered learning an unnecessary burden or even an obstacle for the community of faith. But its main stream has insisted that the love of God is incomplete unless it includes and finds its center in a love and a service of God with the mind. Our heritage is climaxed in those men who, with Abelard, Augustine, Anselm, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, and hosts of others, have found it difficult to distinguish between the love of wisdom and the love of God.

This history is often forgotten. Perhaps it is convenient to forget it, if the severest critics are right. But American Protestantism with its tendencies to over-emphasize the emotional, personal, experiential, and moral aspects of religion dare not forget today that any encouragement of anti-intellectualism, and that any support it may lend to the vulgarization of our culture, is inimical not only to a dominant stream of the heritage of Christian thought but also to the command that man should learn to love God with the mind. Not all of the wisdom we need is to be found in our own history as churches and their colleges, but there can be no denial of the acknowledgement that the transfer to each new generation of the arts, the sciences of literature and of exploration of the material world, has been and continues to be the Christian task of colleges which find their roots in this heritage. To see this clearly is to realize that the first task of a Christian college is that it must be a vigorous, penetrating, and rigorous academic community. The first requirement upon its teachers is learning; the first requirement upon its students is the pursuit of learning. This is not to denigrate the importance of piety, but how is true Christian piety to be related to learning unless there is confidence that true human learning is possible and significant?

Today we find ourselves in an historical moment very different from that one which produced the colleges and the universties of past centuries. Our history does not hold all the secrets we need. Revolution is sweeping the earth—far more radical revolution than most of us can bring into our limited perspective or will admit. In this same critical hour higher education is, in new ways, moving into the center of the stage. Radical events in the societies which are emerging from an underdeveloped past and new forces in the lives of all men are providing us moments of the greatest opportunity and responsibility. During the decade which has just begun, either through worthy response or by unworthy default, important decisions will be made which will leave indelible marks upon the future not only of higher learning but of human life. The decisions demanded of us all, and which will have such deep and continuing effect for years and decades to come, have as their background a world of rapidly changing conditions and a body of knowledge expanding the horizons of human understanding as well as increasing the potentialities of man's power for self-destruction.

We are called upon, therefore, to move in our thinking from remembrance to expectation, from what has been to what must be. Without ignoring the continuing task of having the past placed at the disposal of the future we must stretch our minds toward anticipation. There are those about us today who insist that the future can be secured by more and better knowledge. Though we cannot deny the significance of its expansion, we cannot afford the naivete of such a view. Our commitment and understanding should not permit us assurance that the mere increases of knowledge and of education will permit us security, as long as the orientation is primarily to the nation's defense in an age of spaceplatforms, missiles and technical warfare; as long as the orientation is primarily to prepare students for personal gain of wealth and power; as long as the orientation is for citizenship in a more selfconscious nation-state; but only as long as all our knowing and learning are under the dominant concern for service to God and service to the new and fuller life of all men as his children. Mere increases in knowledge and education which perpetuate the destruction of the identities of persons, which merely mobilize resources for individual or national gain, may turn our increased learning into increased peril and transform what is good into evil.

Dr. Raymond B. Fosdick, the former director of the Rockefeller

Foundation, wrote the following sentences in his auto-biography: "The towering enemy of man is not his techniques, but his irrationality; not silence, but war. Can tolerance and understanding and creative intelligence run fast enough to keep us in line with our mounting capacity to destroy?" Such a penetrating question drives us back into our need to consider the essential problem in the human condition. We may not all agree on the nature of that problem. But the faith into which we have been called in Jesus Christ, and the learning which we undertake in response to that call, provide us some essential beginning points for guidance. The same understanding of the human condition to which the Church is called to proclaim the Gospel is also the understanding of the human condition to which the Christian academic community addresses its pursuit of learning. The Church and the college have their distinctive tasks, and they are different from one another, but they are related to the same understanding of man. And, in their relation to one another, the Church and the college are responsible for one another—that is, for the other fulfilling its own calling under God. Hence, they must be free from one another's domination in order to be responsible for one another. Moreover, to so understand the relationship suggests that the Church does not enter higher education in addition to its primary vocation but it is called into the enterprise of learning as part of its whole vocation.

The essential center of the human condition to which the Christian faith gives attention is the problem of man being unable to receive his life and the world about him. The weird doctrine of the Fall has its roots in a dual recognition: that man as God intended and created him rebelled against his status, having been given the world and sharing an intimate relation with God in it; and, that denying what he was given, man has anxiously grasped out for knowledge and power in a self-willed desire to wrest the world from God and make it his own. Instead of accepting the controlling power in human life as being God, the creator, all men, save Christ, have sought the control of it for themselves for their own ends. They have anxiously pursued the courses which promised increases in power for themselves; they have followed religions—and even turned high religions into vulgar ones—which seemed to deliver God into their own hands; they have sought knowledge with the anxiety that is bred of power and insecurity. Such a writer as the late Albert Camus has helped us to see its futility, for he has said that "all our knowledge cannot finally tell us that the world is for us." Yet, it is this we must know; we are

driven to it by the very need we had implanted within us in God's creation.

Academic life can contribute to the anxiety of man's condition, beyond its capacity today to provide knowledge by which men can destroy themselves. It can be plagued by the unjustified confidence in learning and blind faith in knowledge, leading men to believe that by their wisdom they can secure life, by knowledge we can be assured that the world is for us, and by learning we can come to ourselves. This is the theme of salvation by education! But a Christian family of learning cannot be so naive. Neither can it save the world by religion, for it too can be a chosen vessel of man's arrogance. There is the fragmentary character of all our learning, the dimness of all our seeing, the weakness of all our reason, the proneness to all forms of error. Beyond these, there is the recognition that, were these facts to be corrected, man's primary problem is not ignorance, not technical incompetence, and not power; it is his estrangement from God, his desire to do all things in his own interest, and his need to confirm by his own effort that the world is for him.

Reconciliation begins for man when, because of Christ, he accepts the status of a creature endowed with divine intention, when, because of Christ, he can receive the world as having been given him even for his dominion, and when, because of Christ, he can pursue knowledge, and exercise the power it can give, for the glory of God. God is *for* man and the world is *for* man. The essential ingredient in the new life which is opened to us in Christian faith is that of trust. When we can believe that He is love, that He calls us in freedom for acceptance, and that He commands us in freedom to pursue all learning, then we can also begin to respond in loyalty, obedience, and in the love of all men.

The positive principle which lies at the center of all Christian faith and is most directly relevant to the pursuit of learning is the vision of all life as *negotium cum Deo,* as a dealing with God. This does not mean that God is all mixed into and through the stuff to which the arts and sciences give their attention. Indeed, modern science was in large part made possible, for example, by the insight derived from the doctrine of Creation that the stuff of the world could be cut, analyzed, and moved until it gave up its secrets, without the fear that this was an invasion of the divine and an intrusion upon deity. But what is meant by speaking of life, and all of learning, *as negotium cum Deo*

is that motivating power which is provided is in order that God alone may be glorified. That all the walks of life and all the significant pursuits of learning may be seen as being for the glory of God means two things above all. First that there is no necessity to bring every human endeavor under the control of sacred auspices, for the so-called secular realm, instead of being set in conflict with the sacred, is in its own terms a realm in which man deals with God and God deals with men. Religion consists therefore not so much in doing spiritual or sacred acts, as in doing all things for the glory of God alone. The whole of learning, therefore, comes under the aegis of God; it is a response to the acknowledgement that God has given us the world and our minds, and that they are to be disciplined and used for his glory.

The other effect of pursuing learning to the glory of God is that it provides us a freedom to live in His service. We are engaged in liberal learning, because through knowledge we are freed from the slavery to ignorance, from the limitations of particular prejudices, of particular ages, places, races, and circumstances. If education does not liberate us in this way, it is not liberal education. But the freedom distinctively related to the cause of the service of God is freedom from the anxiety of having to prove man's apostacy—of having to vindicate the claim of man's ultimate supremacy—of being enslaved to ourselves and our idols. The freedom which is provided by dedicating life and learning to the glory of God is freedom from the guilt and anxiety of our attempts to exist as our own god, to find our redemption through education alone, and from the inevitable failure in that attempt. It is the freedom which should result instead in moving us to live in this creative and perilous age as those who seek to know our highest service, the service which Augustine defined as "the enjoyment of God for His own sake and of one's self and one's neighbor for the sake of God." It is the freedom which should set us in the path of investigation and inquiry; we have no need, like Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor, to protect God from his own truth. And, we need not prove ourselves to Him or make ourselves acceptable by our wisdom. He has already accepted us, and to know Him as the God of Truth, who has given us a ministry of reconciliation in Christ, requires us to pursue our learning in the quest of truth. We can then learn that truth is not merely the end, the terminus, of our seeking, but it is the Path of Obedience in which we are called to walk. To walk in that path of dedicated service is also to discover

that we are being given our perfect freedom, for both our learning and our living.

There is a remaining question: Is learning pursued to the glory of God the possibility and unique task of only the Christian college of the liberal arts? It would be naive of course to claim this only for these church-related and church-established colleges. And, it is in part the special task and possibility of such a college as this to help all those who seek truth everywhere, to recognize that they may be, and are, called to do this as a *negotium cum Deo*. But the Christian college of the libreal arts and sciences, beyond this, has the vocation and opportunity of reinforcing every dimension of the academic process—to guide all the subtle forces which make up a live college—so that everything which is done partakes of and contributes to a climate of learning for such a high end.

Such a college has three characteristics which are its credentials, in my opinion. First, it can be a family of learning, a household, in which the criteria by which it measures itself are not those of efficiency applied to the assembly line or factory, not those of coordination as in any organization, but rather those which embody emphasis on personal life and relationships. The economics of business organization are applicable to a college, and the administrative practices of institutions are also useful—up to a point! But then their failure is disclosed, and one must fall back on the structure of the family and the household for one's analogies. The Christian college can be—and at best is—more like a family than a factory.

Second, it is a college which can rigorously pursue all knowledge and it can seek truth where the demands of truth themselves lead it, because the pursuit of knowledge can be both a response to the intentions of God for man and yet need not be anxiously relied on for our salvation. It was not only Luther, but the whole of that intellectual movement of the Reformation which persists in Protestantism which knows that we are justified by faith! And to accept faith as a gift, to celebrate it and live by it, demands inquiry and learning. But it is the faith and not the knowledge it gives or we get elsewhere which justifies us. This permits experimentation in education, freedom from strait-jackets, a kind of involvement in and a detachment from knowledge—it can all be pursued for what it is, and it need not be distorted and destroyed by a false appraisal of it. Knowledge is itself neutral; its use and the end of the knower assign it value and, I believe, the value God sees in it.

Third, the Christian college can build into its endeavors a critical facility of mind and spirit, without having this falter and become a nihilistic cynicism. The "mass culture" of an affluent society or of one which finds in technological skills all the promise for advancement is one that borders always on the fears that Nietzsche saw in democracy. It may become a society which celebrates a monotonous level of mediocrity. The drive toward conformity in everything is overwhelming unless it is possible for such a society to build into each new generation a creative minority of those who dare differences in ideas and tastes. The basic beliefs and institutions of our cherished Western civilization are today threatened. We are already late in stirring ourselves too little about their perpetuation. But the only primary way of their perpetuation is to keep alive in the world the kind of thinking, the courage of spirit, which made our revolutionary past possible, which dared experimentation with the vast scheme of democracy, and which could place a premium on the prophet, the non-conformist, the critic.

This is an educational task. The prophet was rooted in a community beseiged and under the command of serving God and His glory.

We will not have real prophets—true prophets, again today except by the nourishment of a community of faith and a community of learning. The Christian college can be the place where not only this but a larger nourishment is possible—the nourishment of the communities of learning and of faith of one another—until they both, and all men everywhere, can receive the God-intended plan—that man is man—that God alone is God and He only may be finally served. This too is the fulfillment of man!

Three Seventeeth Century Poetic Expressions

ORVAL J. ANDERSON

In a century of much writing on matters of religion, such as the seventeenth century was, it is all too easy for one to place the same stamp on all such writing, and let it go at that. Such is not the case, however, when one looks at the really major poets. To each poet, his religion presented a different problem which he tried to resolve in his own manner or style and from his own personal point of view. Herrick, Donne, and Herbert may well serve to point out the inaccuracy of an unconsidered judgment on the religious poetry of the seventeenth century.

Robert Herrick is too often forgotten as the composer of *Noble Numbers,* a fine group of religious poems. Probably chief among the reasons for this neglect are the extraordinary excellence and popularity of his secular verse and the failure of his religious poems to record the nervous personal feeling of a Jack Donne or the out-and out Anglicanism of a George Herbert. Yet Herrick's *Noble Numbers* deserves attention because it records a distinct point of view of the religious state.

Essentially, as he shows in *Hesperides,* Herrick is not too intense over any experience. This is not a detraction to his art, for he purposed to write in the manner of Horace and Catullus—restrained urbane, and witty. His wit, stemming from a good sense of humor, produced many light, clever songs to his mistresses. The smooth movements of his little lyrics do not usually invoke a sense of im-

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[1]*The Poems of Robert Herrick,* edited by F. W. Moorman (Oxford, 1933), pp. 393-394. All subsequent references to Herrick are from this edition.

mediacy in the reader. One does not feel the emotional strain that Donne's love poems call forth. Herrick is above the grossness of the Donnean love poems; and one feels that even when Herrick tries to be disillusioned, dejected, and even vitriolic toward his mistress, that he is only fooling—too much of a gentleman to really mean it. If one adds an acute feeling for simple country ways to these qualities, he has a fair picture of the author of *Hesperides*. It is not difficult, either, to ferret our restraint urbanity, wit, and simplicity in the *Noble Numbers*. Here is the same Herrick. He has merely given up the May green for the cleric's study.

Herrick's *Noble Numbers* exhibits restraint in subject, form, and emotion. Since Dean Priory was so far removed from the troubled center of London where religious controversy waged hotly during the first sixty years of the seventeenth century, Herrick's subject matter hews strictly to safe, orthodox Anglican doctrine. He writes briefly of absolution, God's providence, pardon, lip-labour, riches, the circumcision and other things of interest in the routine Christian life. It is a discovery when one finds any indication of possible conflict in Herrick's views with that of another sect. In "His Wish to God," Herrick says:

> Thy Crosse, my Christ, fixt'fore mine eyes sho'd be,
> Not to adore that, but to worship Thee.[1]

Even here, one is using a rather tenuous argument if he interprets this as an attack against the Catholic cult of veneration of the Cross. Other examples of awareness to conflicting views of variant religious sects are lacking in Herrick.

Restraint in matter of form exhibits itself in Herrick's choice of the classic epigram form—two or four lines, complete or alternate rime, iambic, and usually pentameter. In his several songs, commemorating religious festivals, he usually follows the antiphon pattern of the litany, verse alternating with chorus, as in his "Anthem, sung . . . at White-Hall, before the King," (p. 362) He does not make use of the fluid, complicated stanza experiments of Donne and Herbert; nor does he indulge in poetic gymnastics except in "The Cross-Tree Here." (p. 425) His uncomplicated subject matter

does not require a complicated meter or verse form. One feels that many of his epigrams, such as

> In Gods command, ne're ask the reason why;
> Let thy *obedience* be the best Reply. (p. 421)

or

> The strength of Baptisme, that's within;
> It saves the soule, by drowning sin. (p. 420)

may well have been used in his catechizing of his country parishoners.

There is an urbanity evident in the relationship between Herrick and his God. He does not ask him to "batter his heart" as Donne does, but rather

> If I have plaid the Truant, or have here
> Fail'd in my part; O! Thou that are my deare,
> My mild, my loving Tutor, Lord and God!
> Correct my errors with Thy Rod. (p. 421)

or

> Come to me, God; but do not come
> To me, as to the gen'rall Doome
> . . . .
> No, lay thy stately terrours by,
> To talke with me familiarly . . . (pp. 416-417)

Herrick is gentle and courteous and humble in making requests of God or in praising him. His voice is ever quiet, easy, and respectfully familiar. He serves his God with drawing-room manners, and the effect upon the reader is always pleasing, precise, and sincere.

Occasionally one encounters a startling image that seems rather bold for a poet of Herrick's sensibilities, but such an image is soon lost sight of in the usually gentle resolution:

> "To Christ."
>
> I crawle, I creep; my *Christ,* I come
> To Thee, for curing *Balsamum:*
> Thou hast, nay more, Thou art the Tree,
> Affording salve of Soveraigntie.
> My mouth I'le lay unto Thy wound
> Bleeding, that no Blood touch the ground:
> For, rather then one drop shall fall
> to wast, my JESU, I'le take all. (p. 400)

In *Hesperides* one finds wit aplenty, and it is not lacking in *Noble Numbers.* In "His Litanie, to the Holy Spirit" one finds:

> When the artlesse Doctor sees
> No one hope, but of his Fees
> And his skill runs on the lees;
> Sweet Spirit comfort me! (p. 368)

And in "To his Conscience" there is a delightful touch of whimsy added to a most serious subject. (p. 378) On the whole, Herrick seems devoid of the startling imagery that often springs from the wit of the metaphysical poets. "To His Saviour" is a near approach to such imagery:

> Lord, I confess, that Thou alone art able
> To purifie this my Augean stable:
> Be the Seas water, and the Land all Sope,
> Yet if Thy Bloud not wash me, there's no hope.
> (p. 378)

Herrick's wit leads him into paradox infrequently, except where it is unavoidable in such Christian themes as "Christ's Incarnation" (p. 412) or "The Virgin Mary". (p. 407)

The dominant quality of *Noble Numbers,* however, is its simplicity. Perhaps this quality may overlap the others somewhat, but it must be mentioned, even if it serves merely to summarize the others. But how can one classify this poem except under the heading of "simplicity"?

> "Another Grace for a Child"
> Here a little child I stand,
> Heaving up my either hand;
> Cold as Paddocks though they be,
> Here I lift them up to Thee,
> For a Benizon to fall
> On our meat, and on us all. *Amen.* (p. 385)

or

> "A Thanksgiving to God, for his House"
> Lord, Thou has given me a cell
> Wherein to dwell;
> A little house, whose humble Roof
> Is weather-proof;

Under the sparres of which I lie
Both soft, and drie;
Where Thou my chamber for to ward
Hast set a Guard
Of harmlesse thought, to watch and keep
Me, while I sleep. (p. 370, lines 1-10)

Herrick's religion, if we are to judge from *Noble Numbers,* is not harsh like the Hebraic nor penitential like the Catholic. He is a baptized Horace, and it is "only natural that some of his most attractive devotional pieces should be expressions of mundane content and thanksgiving." [2]

From Herrick's experience to Donne's experience takes one from cool pastures into Hell's fires. Donne is tortured by a preoccupation with death and sin, and he cannot forget that he was once the gay young man. He does not shun the play of his metaphysical wit upon the mysteries of religion, nor does he refrain from startling rhetoric and involved verse forms. His imagery is often bizarre. He never seems to hold for long the "sweet reasonableness" in the relationship of God to man.

It is in the "Holy Sonnets" that Donne's religious experience is best expressed. His six sonnets to the Earl of Dorset are an ingenious treatment of the mysteries surrounding the life of Christ; but, in spite of their fervor, they never seem more than "trial" pieces. In the group of nineteen sonnets, one finds Donne in his most characteristic unrestraint, brilliantly psychoanalyzing himself.

Donne seems almost to get a masochistic pleasure in crying out over his sufferings:

. . . To poor me is allow'd
No ease; for long, yet vehement grief hath been
Th' effect and cause, the punishment and sin.[3]
But by my death cannot be satisfied

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[2]Douglas Bush, *English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1945), p. 115.

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[3]*The Complete Poems of John Donne,* edited by Robert E. Bennett (Chicago 1942), Holy Sonnet 3, p. 266, lines 12-14. All subsequent references to Donne are from this edition.

My sins, which pass the Jews' impiety.
They kill'd once an inglorious man, but I
Crucify him daily, being now glorified.

(p. 269, line 5-8)

The tension here is great; the issue grave. Yet, there is a certain air of theatricality in the overstatement that indicates self-indulgence. One is led to think that Donne is individualizing his remorse to such an extent that he feels that this is a unique case. It is extreme, individual passion that causes Donne's poetry to lack the general appeal of Herbert's, which takes a broader, more doctrinal view of repentance and remorse.

Donne, in the use of paradox in his sonnet "Death, be not proud," seems to be purging his mind of an ever-present fear. (p. 269) The tone of the sonnet is one of assurance, yet one feels that in spite of the cleverly constructed logic, Donne is whistling in the dark. The conclusion which should come firmly with a note of final victory—two spondees in a row, "Death thou shalt die"—does not really conclude. One can almost hear Donne say after this, "No, No! it is not true, not true." Such seems to be the instability of his mood throughout these poems. He is lower than animals (p. 268); he is a Christ-killer. (p. 272) He seldom resolves his tortured mind to the reader's satisfaction. One feels that the problem exists even after the poem is finished. Hence, the richness of Donne's experience is not limited. It is forever moving outside of his fourteen lines.

In true melodramatic fashion, Donne comes on the stage quizzically: "Thou hast made me, and shall thy work decay" (p. 265) or with remorse: "O my black soul." (p. 266) or defiantly: "Spit in my face, you Jews, and pierce my side . . ." (p. 269) or fearfully: "What if this present were the world's last night?" (p. 270) In melodramatic (or metaphysical) fashion, he gives himself good curtain lines too: "And Satan hates me, yet is loath to lose me." (p. 266) "For thus I leave the world, the flesh and devil," (p. 268) "Nor ever chaste except you ravish me," (p. 271) But all this is an injustice to Donne, for between such startling lines lies a clearly developed thought, most often laced inextricably to a compact image as in sonnet 14 where the author, "like an usurp'd town," yearns for rescue by God. (p. 270-271) Donne's diction is daringly chosen for the purpose of picturing acts of force. He asks God to batter, overthrow, break, blow, and burn. For contrast, he says that God heretofore has been too gentle, has only knocked, breathed, and shone. His final

request is for God to divorce him, imprison him, enthrall him, and ravish him. Then, and only then, will he be free. So, he turns all this violent imagery into a familiar Christian paradox, arrived at freshly and effectively.

Donne records his religious misgivings unsparingly. He does not bask in a "beautiful isle of sweet assurance," as the nineteenth century hymn writer did, but he is ever disturbed by the rough nature of the road to a calm haven of faith. He is worried, over-concerned with self, and at times displays a morbid exuberance; but there is none like him in religious verse. He conveys the alternating terrors and joys of the religious state with more sincerity and artistry than any other lyric poet has ever done. He is not as casually simple as Herrick nor as doctrinally assured as Herbert, but his appeal is limitless and timely to anyone who must combat perverse desires, urgings, and acts. His experiencce may sometimes seem not pretty, but never does it seem untrue. Without sentimentality, he projects the state of his soul into his poetry.

It is, however, in the poetry of George Herbert that one finds the fullest expression of religious experience in both its personal and its institutional aspects. Herbert chose to call his poems *The Temple,* thus making a dual reference—to the church edifice and to his own body. This duality is apparently kept throughout the volume, but the two are welded together, inseparable poetically as they are doctrinally.

In his "The Church Porch," which opens the volume, Herbert is reminiscent of Herrick's epigrams that set forth practical truths of faith and morals.[4] He is here the teacher, cautioning his parishoners just what they must leave outside on the porch if they are to enter God's house and not defile it. The language is simple; the statement, firm. Typical beginning, indicative of his subject matter, are:

> Take not His name, who made thy mouth, in vain . . .
> (p. 3)
> Lie not; but let thy heart be true to God . . . (p. 4)
> Be sweet to all, Is thy complexion sour? (p. 9)
> Pitch thy behaviour low, thy projects high. (p. 13)

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[4]*The Works of George Herbert,* edited by James Yeowell (London, Bell and Daldy, 1859), Vol. II, pp. 1-18. All subsequent references to Herbert are from this edition, Volume II.

Once Herbert is in the church, he loses this didactic style, and although he talks of the church floor, the windows, the roof, and the altar, he makes them all vehicles for the objectivity of subjective feeling, as in

> Lord, how can man preach thy eternal word?
> He is a brittle, crazy glass:
> Yet in thy Temple thou dost him afford
> This glorious and transcendent place,
> To be a window, through thy grace. (p. 67)

He is no longer talking in the bare style of the minister to his flock. He is now conceiving an experience in the exhuberant language and conceit of the metaphysical. In "The Church Floor," he writes

> Hither sometimes Sin steals, and stains
> The marble's neat and curious veins:
> But all is cleansed when the marble weeps.
> Sometimes Death, puffing at the door,
> Blows all the dust about the floor:
> But while he thinks to spoil the room, he sweeps.
> Blest be the Architect, whose art
> Could build so strong in a weak heart. (p. 67)

One may wish, as he reads through *The Temple,* that Herbert had shown a little more restraint in his use of conceit and in his piling up of strange metaphors, for we often get a weird conglomeration as in "Sunday." (p. 76-78)

Herbert is not as intense as Donne, but he often achieves the same strong, theatrical opening:

> I struck the board, and cried, No more;
> I will abroad. (p. 173)
> Kill me not every day,
> Thou Lord of Life . . . . (p. 61)

The intensity, however, does not always carry through the poem, as it does most often in Donne; and Herbert's endings are usually quiet and resigned, all this passion spent, as the ending of "The Collar" illustrates:

> But as I raved and grew more fierce and wild
> At every word,
> Methought I heard one calling, *Child:*
> And I replied, *My Lord!* (pp. 173-174)

No doubt, Herbert felt the call of the world as strongly as Donne; but he like Herrick, in his rural parish at Bremerton, was able to arrive at a greater measure of peace through a better environment for contemplation, away from the religious storm center of London. Certainly the conflict between the world and the spirit is present in Herbert's "The Collar," (p. 173) "The Pulley," (p. 181) and "Jordan" (p. 110). "The Pulley," (pp. 181-182) is such a complete characterization of God's subtle dealings with man that one is apt to overlook a nice point. God keeps rest as his last bait to draw men to him. Both Herrick and Herbert found rest for their souls in their quiet countryside.

Herbert was an obedient servant to Mother Church. In "The British Church," he swears complete allegiance and defies the historic claim of Catholicism as the true church and the presumptuousness of the Nonconformist. He has complete trust in the divine establishment of Anglicanism:

> But, dearest Mother, (what those miss)
> The mean thy praise and glory is,
> And long may be.
> Blessed be God, whose love it was
> To double-moat thee with his grace,
> And none but thee. (p. 119)

In experimenting with form to convey his expression, Herbert surpasses both Donne and Herrick. He achieves startling effect with a brief refrain, monotonously, yet effectively repeated, as in "Home." (pp. 116-118) He often emphasizes a point and segregates it from the following point by conceiving a long third line to a stanza and then chopping off the final foot for a fourth line, as in "Gratefulness". (pp. 137-138). These, and many other effects, are not mere virtuosity but means of securing emphasis and contrast for his theme.

One of Herbert's most interesting experiments is his "Easter Wings," in which through the mechanical appearance of the poem on paper he achieves contrast in words, mood, and movement. (p. 38) One feels that in composing such an exercise, Herbert must have got the same sort of pleasure in making pleasant tribute to his God and his Church as a child gets in making his first crude paper valentine for his mother. There is a humility in Herbert's action, yet there is a pride in expressing a high thought ingeniously for the glory of his Lord.

So, we have Herrick, Donne, and Herbert — all expressing phases of their religious experiences differently conceived and differently executed, yet springing from the same need to communicate strongly felt emotion.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

The Borderland: An Exploration of Theology in English Literature. By Roger Lloyd. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. 111 pages. $2.50.

The Borderland is the realm that literary artists enter when they interpret matters of theology. Some, like Dante and Milton, are permanent citizens of this realm; others, including Shakespeare and Coleridge, and such unexpected visitors as Daniel Defoe and Thomes Hughes, stray in and out. As patron saint of the Borderland, Ezekiel's Man with the Inkhorn attests the venerable sanctity of these writers who make plain to all men the truths that theologians define—in language sometimes "infested with weeds of jargon"—for other theologians.

Roger Lloyd, Residentiary Canon and Diocesian Missioner of Winchester Cathedral, has written historical works, books on his hobby—railways—as well as two novels. In *The Borderland,* he calls himself "an amateur." And *amateur* is a word he honors in its true sense: only artists who are "amateurs," literally as well as theologically, can enter the Borderland. It is this "amateur" spirit that gives *The Borderland* its special freshness and value. In contrast with many of the numerous works on the relations of religion and literature that have appeared recently (Nathan A. Scott, Jr., in his *Modern Literature and the Religious Frontier* [New York: Harper, 1958], lists a five-page bibliography of such works), Canon Lloyd writes neither as a professional literary critic nor as a professional theologian. Instead he takes the reader on a highly instructive and enjoyable tour of the Borderland where literature and theology meet. By the end of the book, he has demonstrated clearly and delightfully how poets and novelists, by means of artistic vision akin to mystic vision, serve Christianity by interpreting its creeds. For "Creeds have to be compressed into poems and doctrines into novels before most moderns will heed them."

Canon Lloyd maps his Borderland by chronology: his examples range from "the Golden Age of Borderland poets" under Elizabeth I to the triumphant approval of Borderland poets in our own time under Elizabeth II. The proof of his thesis is in his examples. Many of them are to be expected: one expects to find Shakespeare everywhere and finds him here. But, as in all of Canon Lloyd's examples, there is fresh perception in his reading of *The Phoenix and the Turtle* as the identification of Charity with love. He does not dwell on the obvious writers: Dante, Milton, the seventeenth-century metaphysical poets, Browning, G. K. Chesterton, and C. S. Lewis are merely acknowledged as Borderland residents of standing. It is the unexpected visitors that make the book stimulating. Daniel Defoe and Thomas Hughes would hardly be thought of as Borderland writers, but Canon Lloyd is convincing when he finds in *Robinson Crusoe* the classic statement of the case for evangelicism, and in *Tom Brown's Schooldays* a vision of the Community of

Saints. Dorothy Sayers and Charles Williams are, again, expected Borderland visitors from the twentieth century, but their plays and other works illuminating Christian doctrine are less familiar to American than to English readers. Less familiar, too, are Emily Bronte's poems and her quest for the mystic vision than is her *Wuthering Heights*. New or familiar, both the examples and the commentaries proffer thought-provoking insights.

The Borderland is English, Anglican, and "amateur"; these points of view, together with the examples of Borderland literature and the interpretations Canon Lloyd gives them, have power to sharpen, especially in an American reader, the seeing eye and the hearing ear for literary values as well as for theological truths in the records of the men with inkhorns.

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Constantine and Religious Liberty. By Hermann Doerries. Translated by Roland H. Bainton. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960. 141 pages. $4.00.

These Yale Terry Lectures are based upon the author's previous biographical and historical study of Constantine. Professor Doerries begins this present survey of the Christian struggle for toleration with high praise of Tertullian's argument that forced worship, because it is insincere, is even less acceptable to God than to those so enjoined. Lactantius reiterated this formula following state extension of universal citizenship and removal of all restrictions on cults except forced emperor worship. The State looked upon inward conscience as the non-essential area, but because it was the most important factor to the Christian, the forced irreverence, exemplified here in a letter of Pliny the Younger, insufferably victimized and betrayed Christian inward conscience.

Professor Doerries, in his enthusiasm for his theme, passes a severe judgment against Diocletian which some historians have not shared with him. Jacob Burckhardt, for example, believed that Diocletian issued his anti-Christian decrees only because he had good evidence of Christian involvement in a sinister plot against his life and government. Christianity had grown so much in numbers and influence by this time that its deflection or adherence in many situations might well have spelled the margin of defeat or victory. The Emperor's wife, daughter, and several members of the Imperial Household were Christian. For more than eighteen years after the reign began, there was no persecution.

Galerius's Edict of Toleration reflects this rapid growth of Christianity, for it requested Christian prayer for the health of emperor and state. The great Edict of Constantine and Licinius issued at Milan, according to the author's viewpoint, reflects Constantine's Christian conviction and Licinius' reluctant surrender to an opposition now grown too strong to overcome.

Doerries emphasizes that the latter was a worshipper of the sun. Ferrero, Burckhardt, and Gibbon, to name only three, are among historians who consider the Edict of Milan to have been a political expedient in the game of power politics. Ferrero, in his monumental study, makes it quite clear that he does not believe Constantine had any other motive than that of power and believes it unlikely that the Emperor recognized at the time the importance of the thing he was doing. This observation is particularly interesting here in the light of the fact that Doerries makes Constantine to analyze the Christian and pagan struggle of his time in the way that the modern, trained theologian might analyze it. In any case, it is historical fact that Constantine had also been a worshipper of the sun, that he had plotted a murder, and that the Edict, instead of addressing one, true God, simply speaks of whatever gods may be. Sir Samuel Dill's studies of this era are replete with evidences of the economic and social brutalities of both Diocletian and Constantine. Again, Doerries refers to Constantine's victory over Licinius at Chrysopolis as a work of God in saving the world from the forces of corruption. The historical investigator may seriously wonder what forces of corruption were eliminated.

The strong desire for peace and quiet which drove the Emperor to direct Christians, now in a majority, to practice toleration led to disappointment. Constantine faced an unconquerable heresy in Donatism and after trying a number of lenient policies, including the Council of Arles, resorted to force which Saint Augustine had long advocated. This having failed, he resolved to send to these northern African schismatics a team of missionaries from Egypt and the East. But here a second serious heresy, Arianism, had arisen. Again Constantine tried to admonish unity on all essentials. After having been led to see the Arian struggle as more than a verbal triviality, he called the Council of Nicea. Professor Doerries rationalizes and explains Constantine's change of tactics in turning from paganism to deal with heresy by assuming that the Emperor anticipated the eventual conversion of pagans. On the other hand, the heretics merely enjoyed his leniency and toleration to drive deeper the wedge of schism. As time went on the problem increased rather than decreased. Exceptional measures were necessary if Christianity was to retain enough unity to remain a harmonizing force in the world.

The author is particularly perceptive in analyzing the nature of truth and toleration. He underlines clearly in his conclusion, as elsewhere in his volume, the danger of state assistance of the Gospel. Translating Constantine's experience in terms of our own day, we must understand that unless we entirely foreswear the use of force, we shall lose that truth for which we wage battle—just as the ancients lost it. Peace cannot be won with war, nor toleration with intolerance. This small volume contains a very provocative analysis throughout and will reward its serious readers.

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Jeremiah. By H. Cunliffe-Jones. (Torch Bible Commentaries). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961, 287 pp. $3.50.

This is the first British commentary on the Book of Jeremiah which has been written in the last thirty years. During this period the British have been active in other aspects of biblical study, however. Now the author, who is Associate Principal of the Northern Congregational College in Manchester, has met a need by writing a very readable commentary which employed as resources some outstanding studies of Jeremiah. These studies include those by A. C. Welch, Wilhelm Rudolph, Julius A. Bewer, Artur Weisner and, in *The Interpreter's Bible,* J. P. Hyatt and S. R. Hopper. Thus Professor Cunliffe-Jones has employed the work of British, German and American scholars.

The book consists of two main sections: a brief (28 pp.) but good Introduction, and a Commentary on the passages in Jeremiah. The language is concise and clear. The format of the whole book encourages the layman to read it: both the Introduction and the Commentary are divided into short sections with topical headings for the sections. This is especially helpful in the Commentary. In the Commentary the comments at times are given verse by verse, and at other times verses are grouped together for comment. The Commentary is based upon the text of the Revised Standard Version.

The distinction between "Jeremianic" and "non-Jeremianic" material is made in both divisions of the book. In other words, the author rightly recognizes that some of the material comes from Jeremiah's dictation to his secretary Baruch, and that sections by other authors have been inserted later. The resultant disorder of the arrangement of the materials in the book is briefly discussed, along with the main features of Jeremiah's character and theology. Mr. Cunliffe-Jones observes that Jeremiah was influenced by Old Testament writings which preceeded him, and in turn he influenced biblical books which followed him.

Some of the Hebrew customs which are unfamilair to the modern reader are explained. Examples include the sash which the bride wore as a mark of her married status (Jer. 2:32) and the practice of placing one's hands upon one's own head to express shame and unhappiness (Jer. 2:37).

Occasionally the author's comments are open to serious questions; e.g., in commenting on Jer. 16:7 he claims that "the Last Supper (I Cor. 11:23-26) is rooted in, and is the transformation of these ancient customs" (p. 129). The "ancient customs" consist of the mourner's practice of fasting until evening on the day of the burial (but in one instance cited—II Sam. 12:16-23—King David does just the opposite: he fasts while his child is ill and begins to eat again when he learns of the child's death). How can a meal eaten repeatedly in memory of a person's death, such as the Lord's Supper, be "rooted in" the practice of fasting only at the time of a person's death? Rather, it seems that the difference between them is so great that it is not a case of "transformation" but of completely independent origins.

The purpose of the Torch Bible Commentaries series is "to concentrate the mind on the essential Gospel contained in the various books of the

Bible" (p. 2). The author has conformed to this purpose, for, as he states in the Preface, the distinctive character of his commentary comes from considering the question, "What meaning and truth does the Book of Jeremiah have for us today?" (p. 11). Although this is a commendable purpose, there are two dangers inherent in it: 1) the tendency to give a lop-sided impression of the Bible by omitting discussion of less desirable aspects, and 2) the temptation to misinterpret passages in directions which will fit today's culture. Professor Cunliffe-Jones, however, usually bases his religious notes upon evidence and good judgement; furthermore, the quantity of the religious lessons is kept in reasonable proportion to the literary and historical commentary.

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Wesley's Christology: An Interpretation. By John Deschner. Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1960. 220 pp. $4.50.

This recent book by Dr. John Deschner, Associate Professor of Theology at Southern Methodist University, is a valuable contribution to the body of Wesleyan materials and to soteriological studies. It represents extensive research and study, a considerable amount of which was done at the University of Basel, and under tutelage of Dr. Karl Barth.

The author's plan of research of the subject is to scrutinize, particularly for Christological concepts, the Wesleyan Works usually considered Standards for Methodism, i. e., the twenty five "Articles of Religion," Wesley's "Standard Sermons," and his "Notes on The New Testament." Because of the latter's revelation of New Testament backgrounds, and thus of Wesley's intimate thinking and positions, these are most carefully followed and considered as primary source material. These are allowed to speak their own dominant trends of thought and establish norms of interpretations. The result is an outline of Wesley's Christology showing conformity and non-conformity, strength and weakness, bold profession and conservative reticence, careful delineation and obscure presupposition.

The author's promise is that, although there are many gaps in definitiveness and conclusiveness in Wesley's sorteriological thinking, it is the developing conception and experience of The Christ by faith that leavened and outlined his theological outlook, dynamized his personal religious experiences, and motivated and directed his consequent living and preaching. This resulted in the impact of his life and Methodism upon the world.

This premise is delineated by the careful consideration of the following Christological concepts:

1. The Person of Christ. As regards His two natures, unified in the Virgin Birth. He was God and Man, Divine and human, and in this union there was the necessary communication of each nature to the other of those

properties which gave to the union that unity and capacity for the total Person of Christ and His work, yet each retained its essential distinction.

2. The States of Christ. Although Wesley does not greatly emphasize these, yet there is the pre-existent glory with the Father; the humiliation in incarnation and death, and His exaltation in resurrection and ascension. These, presupposed or even partially developed, as Wesley sometimes does, add to the unity of the picture of The Christ.

3. The Work of Christ. This is divided into the non-mediatorial, which includes Christ's work in creation, and His providential work as Supporter, Governor, and Preserver of all things; and His mediatorial work of grace, which by the plan of penal substitution secures man's justification and establishes for him a course to sanctification.

4. The three Offices. Christ's one Mediatorial Office is sub-divided into three parts: viz., (A) The Prophetic Office in which He is The Revelator-Teacher of the things of God; (B) The Priestly Office, which has a relatively high priority in Wesley's teaching, and in which Christ secures the atonement and becomes The Heavenly Intercessor; and (C) The Kingly Office, in which Christ conquors sin in the believer, and ultimately "Subdues all things unto Himself." The Mediatorial Office is founded in the Cross.

This book can be of considerable value to the minister and layman. First, it can bring valuable supplementary organization and interpretation to published Wesleyan Christological materials. Thus we are better able to understand, evaluate, appreciate, and follow Wesley as a great religious pilgrim, teacher, and leader. Not only Methodists, but any religious practitioner can be instructed and inspired by portrayal of the religious thinking of this historical figure.

Second, this study can refresh thinking on the basic ideas underlying Protestant Theology which influenced Wesley as well as all religious thinkers. We are made aware anew of the heritage of faith common to all our ways, and our great interdependence in matters of faith and practice.

Third, this treatment can encourage and enable re-examination of the soteriological presuppositions of historic Methodism, and their implications for the present-day Church. Thus the "Faith of Our Fathers" can be made more relevant, vital, and challenging.

Fourth, this study can make more obvious the incompleteness of man's understandings, and the urgency to have opened the doors of greater revelation, interpretation, and implementation of our conceptions and experiences. The total presentation of this volume has dealt with Wesley's discernible intention as well as specifics of his teachings, and with his growth as well as fixated positions.

Several study aids are very helpful in the use of this significant volume. Each chapter is concluded with a climaxing, unifying, and thought-inducing comment. Also there are ample, widely drawn, and supplementing footnotes. The book is then concluded by a concise summary conclusion, by appendixes of the numbering of "Wesley's Sermons," by supplementary statements about the Offices of Christ, and Wesley's editing of the "Homily of Salvation." A

carefully selected Bibliography is included, and the whole is completed by generous indexing.

THOMAS RECTOR

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The Book of Revelation. By Charles M. Laymon. New York, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960. 176 pp. $3.00.

Dr. Charles Laymon, chairman of the department of religion and professor of religion at Florida Southern College, and editor of *The International Lesson Annual,* writes: "Revelation is at one and the same time the most revered, the most misunderstood, and the most neglected of New Testament writings." On this statement, both layman and minister will most likely agree. In Dr. Laymon's attempt to clarify this last book of the New Testament so that it can be better understood by the whole church, he sets forth the interpretation that St. John's Letter from Patmos was written "for the entire body of church members and not for a particular group." His purpose, of coures, is to guide the entire body of church members to a basic understanding and appreciation of this neglected Book of the Bible. There are two steps to fulfilling this purpose: first, he interprets the materials in relation to their immediate background; second, he describes their message, in principle, for all time.

Most ministers or Bible teachers know Dr. Laymon is right when he speaks of Revelation as revered, yet misunderstood and neglected. The Book is largely ignored in the Church because it is so full of mystery, symbolism, allegory, and dreams. Many consider the book meaningless. It is used by some groups to "prove" weird accounts of the end of the world, the final judgment, identification of the anti-Christ, or other controversial aspects of the Christian eschatology. The Church has not been as enriched as it could have been by this book because of the tendency to ignore it or to read into it particularly religious, social, and political dogmas and prejudices.

Dr. Laymon does not attempt a chapter-by-chapter study, but rather an interpretation of the major individual passages of the Apocalypse "relating them to one another so that the reader may grasp the message and meaning of the Book as a whole." One of the values of this book is his lifting up the eternal principles of Revelation which are: the claim that the universe is moral at heart, emphasis on the authority of Christ, stress on the significance of suffering for righteousness' sake, and the supreme message that "Christ will emerge in history as King of kings and Lord of lords." "His victory," says Dr. Laymon, "will be the victory of all who place their trust in Him. Thus there is purpose in living and hope in dying."

This study, based on sound scholarship, can easily be read by those who are unfamiliar with much of the technical vocabulary of biblical scholarship.

Dr. Laymon's lucid style also helps clarify some of the more obscure passages. He deals honestly and forthrightly with the numerical, animalistic, and other apocalyptic symbols of the visions, yet does so without forcing the text into his own view of political history. "The four horsemen of the apocalypse," "Babylon, the great mother of harlots and of earth's abominations," "Armageddon," "The Millennium," and "the new Jerusalem" are discussed and explained. The subjects are handled as the author purposed in the beginning —in light of the historical situation in which they were written and their value for living today. He briefly discusses the development of these concepts in the apocalyptic writings of the Old Testament and the Apocrypha.

At the close of the book there are six pages of charts, maps, historical listings, and formulas which will help the reader to understand the maze of visions and symbols. Many will be interested in the five formulas which have been used in the past to identify the Beast (and its apocalyptic number of 666) as Caesar, Roman Catholicism, the Pope, or Adolf Hitler.

This approach to Revelation comes at the right time. This study is needed by the Church that must speak to a world which has in its hands indescribable power and needs the emphasis of Revelation as much as the Church that had to deal with the power of Rome in A.D. 95-96. After dealing with these tremendous themes with little sermonizing or theologizing, Dr. Laymon admits his hesitancy to let go of these all-encompassing concepts. But he does let go with the significant comment that "they will not let go of us." They won't either. After finishing this book many readers will go back to the Revelation of St. John with new insights for a richer understanding of its meaning and a stronger hope for the tomorrows of our world.

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Nursery-Kindergarten Weekday Education in the Church. By Josephine Newbury. Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1960. 203 pp. $3.50.

Josephine Newbury has done an excellent job in bringing together much information and material that will prove to be invaluable to teachers and administrators of the church-sponsored weekday nursery-kindergarten programs. Miss Newbury has drawn her ideas and information from her own personal experiences and study in this field of work. She is the director-teacher of the demonstration kindergarten at the Presbyterian School of Christian Education in Richmond, Virginia. Her educational background and practical experience have been put to excellent use in her present role and are revealed throughout her book as she guides the reading teacher. A graduate of Oglethorpe University with a major in science and education, Miss Newbury received an M. A. in Early Childhood Education from George

Peabody College for Teachers. She served for many years as a teacher and assistant principal in the Fulton County school system at Atlanta, Georgia. She not only directs the demonstration kindergarten, but is also Professor of Christian Education.

Nursery-Kindergarten Weekday Education in the Church is a book that will help to meet the needs of the teacher in the church-sponsored weekday nursery-kindergarten programs of the church. Procedures and methods of teaching and learning as presented in the book are educationally sound. Discussions of child growth and development are in keeping with the newest research in this field. The suggested program will permit the child to live as a Christian in a Christian environment with Christian adults who are interested in his growth and development as a Christian.

The author helps committees and administrators in the local church to understand their role in the community as well as the church when they provide a weekday nursery-kindergarten program for the young child. She helps them to see that providing such an opportunity for Christian growth is their privilege. She also gives them invaluable details of many administrative problems in relation to staff, space, equipment, program and even such matters as janitorial service, insurance and transportation. The book clearly gives a guiding standard for age of children and size of group.

One of the most valuable contributions of the book is the chapter on special days for young children. Here the author helps the teacher to understand the meaning of such days as Halloween, Thanksgiving, Christmas, Valentine's Day, Easter and birthdays in the program of Christian Education for young children. In face of all the pressures of the advertisements in the world about us it is often difficult to know what to do in the program for our children. Miss Newbury helps the teacher to see the right place of such observations and has many suggestions which are practical and helpful.

The content of the daily program for the young child is covered in discussions on health and safety, music, creative art experiences, literature, play, science and language development. Not only does the author give good descriptions of these program elements with suggestions for development, but she gives the most helpful listings of all kinds of resources. There are complete up-to-date bibliographies of books for teachers, lists of sources of free and inexpensive materials, lists of books for young children, lists of resources for audio-visual aids and recordings.

Nursery-Kindergarten Weekday Education in the Church has been developed through the cooperative efforts of many denominations seeking through an interdenominational agency, the Cooperative Publication Association, to provide publications of sound educational value and practical usefulness.

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Japanese Contributions to Christian Theology. By Carl Michalson. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960. 192 pages. $3.95.

Fujii, Hatano, Kitamori, Miyamoto, and Watanabe may be strange sounding names to the average American minister, but these Japanese theologians have wrestled with the same theological problems Western man has concerned himself with for nearly two thousand years. Dr. Michalson, Professor of Systematic Theology at Drew, has done an admirable job of critically summarizing the major theological thought of the Non-Church group in Japan.

This is an important book in that it carefully presents the main theological tendencies of a group which regards itself as a third and independent ground alongside Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, and as the "true and final form of Christianity."

God Our Contemporary. By J. B. Phillips. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. 137 pages. $2.50 (cloth); $1.25 (paperback).

Known best for his stimulating translations of the Bible into ordinary English (*Letters to Young Churches* and *The New Testament in Modern English*), in this work Dr. Phillips attempts to point up the necessity for making the Christian Gospel clear to both the faithful and the unfaithful. Severely criticizing humanism, the author makes a thoughtful plea for a Christian humanism—the kind advocated by Jesus Christ. Especially valuable for the clergyman is Phillips's cogent statement of the essential Christian faith (pp. 7-8)

Leaves from a Spiritual Notebook. By Thomas S. Kepler. New York: Abingdon Press, 1960. 304 pages. $5.50.

A master anthologist brings together a treasury of inspirational bits of prose, poetry, and prayers. Here we find the serious musings of such persons as Benjamin Franklin, Charles Dickins, Martin Luther, Helen Keller, George Santayana, Albert Schweitzer, and many others of like spirit. Invaluable as a source for sermon illustrations (it is indexed!). The reprinting of Charles Dickens's letter reporting little Dora's death is in itself worth the price of this helpful volume.

John Calvin and the Calvinistic Tradition. By Albert-Marie Schmidt. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961. 192 pages. $1.50.

This original paperback gives one of the finest short studies of John Calvin to be found anywhere. Written simply, but with scholarly care, and illustrated profusely, this little volume traces Calvin's personal and spiritual development from early youth to his final days in Geneva. Special chapters

on the importance of Calvinism in contemporary theology, including an excellent statement on Karl Barth's debt to Calvin, make this volume an important addition to the minister's library.

Teach Yourself New Testament Greek. By D. F. Hudson. New York: Association Press, 1960. 178 pages. $3.75.

In a day when the interest in languages has reached a new high, and language study has become a hobby for many, a book on the Common Greek of the New Testament is especially significant. In 28 lessons D. F. Hudson of the Language School in Darjeeling, India, presents a dynamic approach to Greek. Loyal adherence to his technique and proper discipline of study should have the student reading the New Testament within six months. Try it.

Stammerer's Tongue. By David Head. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960. 106 pages. $2.50.

Subtitled "A Book of Prayers for the Infant Christian," this little volume is addressed to the new Christian in hopes of providing guidance in the prayer life. Though lacking in formal organization, the clear prose and poetry of this book should appeal to the layman, especially if he has just started on the Christian adventure.

The Protestant Faith. By George W. Forrell. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentiss-Hall, Inc., 1960. 321 pages.

In clear and concise prose, solidly constructed on the famous ecclesiastical creeds, the author of this volume gives an excellent presentation of classical Protestantism. The chapters on the Doctrine of Man, Doctrine of Christ, The Holy Spirit and The Church, and Eschatology make good reading for clergyman and layman. An unusually fine Appendix contains an assortment of historically significant creeds and confessions of faith. The content of the volume, along with its easy style, portrays Protestantism as "a live option for modern America"—which is the salient reason Dr. Forrell authored this book.

Religious Education. Edited by Marvin J. Taylor. New York: Abingdon Press, 1960. 446 pages. $6.50.

This impressive volume is a long-overdue "sequal" to *Studies in Religious Education* (1931) and *Orientation in Religious Education* (1950). The author

brings together the contemporary thought of such persons as Daniel Day Williams, Lawrence C. Little, Walter Houston Clark, Paul B. Maves, J. Edward Dirks, Ernest M. Ligon, and many others. A selected bibliography and a Biographical Index of Contributors add to the value of this reference. Certainly a copy should be in every church school office, read, it is hoped, by every Director of Religious Education.

A Theology of the Living Church. (Revised Edition) By L. Harold DeWolf. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. 383 pages.

Since this single-volume theology appeared in 1953 it has become a standard text in many theological schools, and for good reason. It is a clear presentation of the basic issues of theology; and the writer's humility and earnest desire to "reason together" with all adds a warm touch that should make the book a must for all ministers interested in the theological conversations. This revised edition strengthens the presentation in many ways. Especially significant are the new discussions on religious experience as "encounter" and the expansion on the Christological problem.

God's Mission—and Ours. By Eugene L. Smith. New York: Abingdon Press, 1961. 169 pages. $3.25.

This is a book about missions and theology. Unfortunately, the chapters on theology are not meaningfully integrated into the excellent descriptions of the mission enterprises.

One of the most fascinating contributions of this book is its many actual illustrations of the work being done by the "younger churches" in the areas of race relations, stewardship, and Christian witness. Reading these accounts not only reminds us of the trials Paul's young churches faced but may jar Americans upright, prompting them to understand that there are many countries in the world today where being Christian involves severe personal sacrifice and courage.

Jesus and The Trinity. By Walter Russell Bowie. New York: Abingdon Press, 1960. 160 pages.

Here is a clearly written volume on a doctrine which frequently elicits clouded expressions from laymen and painful countenances from clergymen!

Dr. Bowie wisely starts by insisting that "if we are ever to see more than the fathers saw we must begin by being sure that we see what they did see." His tour is scholarly but relevant, and his constant reminder is always that we must start with Jesus if we are truly to appreciate the meanings of the Trinity.

In a sentence, trinitarian faith is the conviction that there is a threefold experience for Christian souls, and that this threefold experience finds its unity in God.

Methodism and Society in Theological Perspective. By S. Paul Schilling. New York: Abingdon Press, 1960. 318 pp. $5.00.

This is the first of a four-volume series in The Methodist Church in Social Thought and Action project. This volume, written by S. Paul Schilling, who is Professor of Systematic Theology at Boston University School of Theology, deals with the relation of theology to Methodist social action and culminates in a theology of society.

Undoubtedly this volume, along with its companions, will serve as sound stimulus material for church study groups for many years to come. Based heavily on the empirical findings of the MESTA project, this volume on theology and social action sets a high standard for those yet to come. Dr. Schilling has managed to integrate statistical data with wise interpretation and as a result gives Methodism some clear guidelines for the future.

The section on the ministry of the laity and society is especially provocative, claiming as it does that ultimately what counts most are the actions of Christian laymen, thoroughly involved in God's redemptive purpose.

The New Testament Basis of Pacifism and The Relevance of an Impossible Ideal. By G. H. C. Macgregor. Nyack, New York: Fellowship Publications, 1960. 160 pages. $1.25 (paperback).
The Dagger and the Cross. By Culbert G. Rutenber. Nyack, New York: Fellowship Publications, 1958. 142 pages. $1.50 (paperback).

These two Fellowship of Reconciliation paperback publications make an excellent pair of study guides for the individual or group interested in discovering something about Christian Pacifism.

Macgregor's book has been used for many years as a scholarly, biblically oriented introduction to the problem of pacifism; this revised edition adds a contemporary dimension.

Rutenber's is much more general in tone, but it, too, presents a clear examination of Christian Pacifism.

No matter the individual's personal point of view on pacifism, both books would prove helpful to concerned clergymen and laymen.

Life is Commitment. By J. H. Oldham. New York: Association Press, 1959. 127 pages. 50c.

This is another of the fascinating experimental series entitled Reflection Books, in this instance an abridgment of Dr. Oldham's attempt to demonstrate the relevance of Christianity to our modern ages. This frank discussion of major theological subjects in lively lay language is ideal for the person just starting on the Christian journey.

The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. By Ernst Troeltsch. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. Two Volumes. 1019 pages. $2.25, $2.45. Vol. 2.

The general reader will find these volumes tough going, but the scholarship and insight are well worth the effort. This exhaustive study is already a classic, first published in German in 1911 under the title, *Kirchen und Gruffen.* Troeltsch attempted a gigantic task in presenting a history of the practice of Christianity, which essentially is what this study is about, and only an intellectual giant could have accomplished the feat. This is serious reading for the serious reader.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Babbage, Stuart B., and Siggins, Ian. *Light Beneath the Cross.* New York: Doubleday and Co., 1960. 161 pages. $2.95.

Brown, Robert McAfee, and Weigel, Gustave. *An American Dialogue.* New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961. 240 pages. .95c.

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Feinsilver, Alexander. *In Search of Religious Maturity.* Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1960. 124 pages. $3.50.

Fosdick, Harry Emerson. *The Modern Use of the Bible.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961. 291 pages. $1.95.

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Nilsson, Martin P. *Greek Folk Religion.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961. 166 pages. $1.25.

Smith, T. V. ed. *From Thales to Plato.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. 398 pages. $1.95.

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